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Editorial

Privacy—an elusive concept
Christopher Kuner*, Fred H. Cate**, Christopher Millard**, and
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson***
It is interesting to consider how difficult it is to
describe what ‘privacy’ is. Attempts at defining privacy
date back, at least, to Warren and Brandeis’ 1890’s
description of it as the ‘right to be let alone’.1 Another,
more recent, definition is that privacy is ‘The interest
of a person in sheltering his or her life from unwanted
interference or public scrutiny.’2 Perhaps an even more
sophisticated definition would be to say that privacy
relates to ‘[m]aterial that so closely pertains to a
person to his[/her] innermost thoughts, actions and
relationships that he[/she] may legitimately claim the
prerogative of deciding whether, with whom and under
what circumstances he[she] will share it.’3 None of
these definitions could necessarily be said to be more
correct than the others, but taken together they provide
a useful composite view of what we mean when we talk
about privacy.
While it is notoriously difficult to define ‘privacy’,
the other side of the coin is that virtually everyone
thinks they know what privacy is, or instinctively has
ideas as to what it entails. Privacy is also often
described in terms of its tension with other objectives
or interests, in particular the following three types of
tension:

The tension between privacy as a human right
and data as a commercial commodity
The right of privacy is well established in international
human rights law. Already in 1948, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognized
such a right. It is therefore only logical that when the
UDHR inspired the development of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in
1966, the right of privacy was included (see Article 17).
Privacy is also considered a human right in a number
of regional and national legal systems (eg in the European Union).
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At the same time, one of the most important things
protected by privacy law is personal data, which has
become a valuable commercial commodity. And it is
here that we observe the tension between the dual
nature of privacy as a human right and a subject of
commercial interest.
This tension between the two views of privacy
may cause courts specializing in human rights questions to fail to recognize the commercial implications
of their decisions, while at the same time, courts not
specializing in human rights matters may fail to fully
appreciate the delicate nature of the fundamental right
at stake.
Perhaps it could be suggested that, as currently
structured, most legal systems are not particularly well
equipped to deal with clashes between a fundamental
human right and competing commercial interests?

The tension between privacy and governmental interests
Governments have a long history of recognizing the
value of good record-keeping, and many countries
today carry out privacy-invasive population surveys on
a regular basis. Indeed, the Norman government’s
survey of Anglo-Saxon England, completed in 1086
(almost a thousand years ago!), was felt to be so intrusive that the resulting records have been referred to as
the Domesday book.
Today, many, but far from all, countries impose
restrictions on their governments’ data collection. Such
restrictions are only natural, considering the powers
governments have to compel data disclosure from their
citizens.

The tension between privacy and security
One of the most prominent examples of the tensions
between privacy and the interest of the government is
2
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found in the context of public security. While public
security has always been on the governmental radar,
the issue gained unprecedented attention following the
9/11 terrorist attack and the subsequent acts of terrorism in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Expanded
powers were provided to law enforcement agencies,
resulting in concern amongst civil libertarians and
privacy advocates.
This clash is natural, predictable, and incredibly difficult to balance. On the one hand there are the
demands of the security agencies—which are often
vague and complex, as it is virtually impossible to
predict in detail what types of information may
become of relevance in the hunt for terrorists—and on
the other hand there is the elusive concept of privacy,
including concerns about governments’ data use,
ranging from the outright paranoid to the appropriately sceptical.
The reality is that this clash of interests can never be
balanced in the abstract, but only on a case-by-case
basis. Put differently, one cannot know whether a
certain security concern justifies the sacrifice of privacy,
without knowing a great deal about the nature of the
security concern as such. Again, this is something that
the legal system is ill-equipped to deal with, as such a
case-by-case approach comes at the cost of predictability and consistency.

Accepting the elusiveness and moving
forward
The above discussion has highlighted that privacy is
a difficult right to define, and that privacy interests
often compete directly with other interests. However,
it is important that we do not allow uncertainties
about what privacy is to get in our way of protect-
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ing it, both domestically and in the international
arena.
Those sceptical of international cooperation on
privacy may object that harmonization of national laws
has little hope of success until we agree on what we are
protecting. But irrespective of which definition of
privacy is used, a sufficient number of states agree on
some core elements that need protection. Thus, while
the debate over exactly what privacy means is important, there are certainly some core conceptions that
almost all societies share, and yet do precious little to
enforce.
So whatever we do at the margins, an important
step would be to strengthen protection around at least
those core understandings, such as freedom from government surveillance without some appropriate oversight and legitimate purpose.

Privacy as the flavour of the month and
beyond
Finally, it is also interesting to consider what the publication of a journal such as ours says about privacy law.
First, and most obviously, the fact that there is a
market for a journal specifically on data privacy highlights the prominence that privacy law has gained in
recent times. In addition, the Journal’s existence
suggests that data privacy law is a sufficiently distinct,
and identifiable, area of law to be treated separately
from other related areas. In other words, data privacy
law is not merely a sub-specialty of human rights law,
administrative law, or Internet law, but is a separate
discipline.
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